

## Towards Automated Learning of Access Control Policies Enforced by Web Applications

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### Have you ever been overwhelmed with...





## Our strategy to tackle such security/privacy concerns:

- Systematically infer access control policies enforced in web applications
- Inferred access control policies can be utilized by:
  - End users for understanding application's security behavior
  - Developers for validating implementation vs. specification



### Previous works have ...

- Focused on developing efficient algorithms for mining correct and concise access control policies
- Considered abstract systems with availability of inputs –
  low-level authorizations & application's data model



### **Relationship-Based Access Control Policy Mining**

#### **Low-level authorizations: Which Application's data model: System graph** user can access what resource connecting users and resources Decision User Resource friends owns **F-Post** Alice Fred Alice **F-Post** Permit friends family owns Bob A-Post Permit -Dave friends friends A-Post Eve Carol **B-Post** Permit family family **F-Post** Dave Deny owns **B-Post** Bob Carol friends Eve **B-Post** Deny

#### Policy Miner Algorithm

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 Users can access their own posts
 Users can access posts owned by their friends

Access Control Policy High-level rules based on relationships between users and resources

### Motivation

- Policy mining must be applicable to real-world systems
- Two inputs to mining process not readily available in real systems
- Need to infer the two mining inputs themselves



## Challenges with concretizing policy mining

- Many real-world applications handle large amount and variety of data objects
  - e.g., social networks support posts, comments, likes, and various content types like image and video
- Different types of data objects may have different applicable policies
  - Friends can see and comment on my posts
  - Friends of friends can only see my posts if they are also colleagues



## Contributions

- Inferring data model and low-level authorizations
  - Automating and observing user interactions with a web application
- Black-box view of application lets us observe its access control behavior as a whole
  - Helps overcome application's design complexities



## Our black-box inference strategy





## Applying ReBAC Mining to Infer Policies from Web Applications





## Two-fold approach



Infer application's data model



Infer low-level authorizations using inferred data model



## Two-fold approach - Infer Data Model



#### Infer application's data model

- Jdentify object properties from client-server interactions
- Cluster identified properties to prune spurious properties



- Infer object relations using their distinguishing properties
- Prune redundant object relationships using heuristics



Infer low-level authorizations using inferred data model



## Two-fold approach - Infer Authorizations



Infer application's data model



Infer low-level authorizations using inferred data model

- Identify inferred data objects present in client-server interactions
- User permitted to view data model object & its properties if (s)he can view that object on any page of application; otherwise denied



## Inferring authorizations is not trivial!

A major challenge being Object-Reidentification!

- That is, how to correlate data elements viewed on a web page to data objects in inferred data model
- No abstract notion as data object; data objects usually characterized in terms of its corresponding attributes



## Reidentifying Objects from Inferred Data Model

• Utilize unique properties of data objects to identify corresponding web page data with all those properties





### **Output Format**

**Object-Level Policy:** Authorizations specified on data objects like posts and comments

• e.g., users can access their own and their friends' posts

**Attribute-Level Policy:** Authorizations specified on attributes of data objects like date-time, location, title

• e.g., only users who own a post can see its location



## Experimental observations for mined attribute-level rules



- Ground truth based on what different users can see on their interfaces
- Able to mine most attribute-level policies in both applications
  - Failed in cases such as dates shown as "2 days ago" instead of absolute values
- Also mined policies for hidden attributes used by application to describe a data object
  - e.g., object-id present in the raw HTML to reference a post or a comment

Application	Rule	Data Type	Mined	Ground-Truth (visible atts.)	1	11	1Ŷ	↓
Elgg	[ <i>p</i> ]	Post	27	19	16	6	5	3
	[f, p]	Post	23	15	12	6	5	3
	[p, -b]	Comment	20	12	11	3	6	1
	[ <i>c</i> ]	Comment	24	16	15	3	6	1
	$[f, p, -b] \land [f, c]$	Comment	20	12	11	3	6	1
Funkwhale	[o, -i]	Audio file	35	28	24	6	5	4
	[w, -i]	Audio file	29	23	20	6	3	3

#### Mined object-level rules

Application	Rule	Data Type	Mined	Ground-Truth (visible atts.)		<b> ↑</b>	1 î l	↓
Elgg	[ <i>p</i> ]	Post	27	19	16	6	5	3
	[f, p]	Post	23	15	12	6	5	3
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	[w, -i]	Audio file	29	23	20	6	3	3

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	[ <i>p</i> ]	Post	27	19	16	6	5	3
	[f, p]	Post	23	15	12	6	5	3
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#### Visible attributes of certain data object type to users

satisfying the given object-level rule

[	Application	Rule	Data Type	Mined	Ground-Truth (visible atts.)	1	<b> 1 </b>	1Î	↓
		$\rightarrow$ [p]	Post	27	19	16	6	5	3
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### **Conclusion and Future Work**

- Concretizing ReBAC mining to web applications
- Inferring data model and low-level authorizations by observing client-server interactions
- Experimented on two applications to show feasibility
- Future plans include:
  - Investigating further automation of trace generation
  - Experimenting on wider set of real-world applications